The depth of SAML [SAML Summary]

1. History

Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is an XML standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between entities which is a product of the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee.

- SAML 1.0 was adopted as an OASIS standard in Nov 2002
- SAML 1.1 was ratified as an OASIS standard in Sept 2003
- SAML 2.0 became an OASIS standard in Mar 2005

Liberty Alliance donated its Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF) specification to OASIS, which became the basis of the SAML 2.0 specification. Thus SAML 2.0 represents the convergence of SAML 1.1, Liberty ID-FF 1.2, and Shibboleth 1.3.

2. SAML base standards

SAML is built upon the following technology standards.

- Extensible Markup Language (XML)
- XML Schema
- XML Signature
- XML Encryption (SAML 2.0 only)
- Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)

3. SAML Components

Assertions: Authentication, Attribute and Authorization information
Protocol: Request and Response elements for packaging assertions
Bindings: How SAML Protocols map onto standard messaging or communication protocols
Profiles: How SAML protocols, bindings and assertions combine to support a defined use case

4. Assertions and Protocols for SAML v2.0

The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) defines the syntax and processing semantics of assertions made about a subject by a system entity. In the course of making, or relying upon such assertions, SAML system entities may use other protocols to communicate either regarding an assertion itself, or the subject of an assertion. This specification defines both the structure of SAML assertions, and
an associated set of protocols, in addition to the processing rules involved in managing a SAML system. This specification is considered as the SAML Core specification and these constructs are typically embedded in other structures for transport, such as HTTP form POSTs and XML-encoded SOAP messages.

5. Bindings for SAML v2.0

Bindings for SAML specifies SAML protocol bindings for the use of SAML assertions and request-response messages in communications protocols and frameworks.

Mappings of SAML request-response message exchanges onto standard messaging or communication protocols are called SAML protocol bindings (or just bindings). An instance of mapping SAML requestresponse message exchanges into a specific communication protocol <FOO> is termed a binding for SAML or a SAML <FOO> binding. For example, a SAML SOAP binding describes how SAML request and response message exchanges are mapped into SOAP message exchanges.

The intent of this specification is to specify a selected set of bindings in sufficient detail to ensure that independently implemented SAML-conforming software can interoperate when using standard messaging or communication protocols.

Following bindings are covered under this specification.

- SAML SOAP Binding
- Reverse SOAP (PAOS) Binding
- HTTP Redirect Binding
- HTTP POST Binding
- HTTP Artifact Binding
- SAML URI Binding

6. Profiles for SAML v2.0

Profiles for SAML specifies profiles that define the use of SAML assertions and request-response messages in communications protocols and frameworks, as well as profiles that define SAML attribute value syntax and naming conventions.

One type of SAML profile outlines a set of rules describing how to embed SAML assertions into and extract them from a framework or protocol. Such a profile describes how SAML assertions are embedded in or combined with other objects (for example, files of various types, or protocol data units of communication protocols) by an originating party, communicated from the originating party to a receiving party, and subsequently processed at the destination. A particular set of rules for embedding SAML assertions into and extracting them from a specific class of <FOO> objects is termed a <FOO> profile of SAML.

For example, a SOAP profile of SAML describes how SAML assertions can be added to SOAP messages, how SOAP headers are affected by SAML assertions, and how SAML-related error states should be reflected in SOAP messages.

Another type of SAML profile defines a set of constraints on the use of a general SAML protocol or assertion capability for a particular environment or context of use. Profiles of this nature may constrain optionality, require the use of specific SAML functionality (for example, attributes, conditions, or bindings), and in other respects define the processing rules to be followed by profile actors.

Following profiles are covered under this specification.

- SSO Profiles of SAML [Web Browser SSO Profile,Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP) Profile, Identity Provider Discovery Profile, Single Logout Profile, Name Identifier Management Profile]
- Artifact Resolution Profile
- Assertion Query/Request Profile
- Name Identifier Mapping Profile
- SAML Attribute Profiles

7. Metadata for SAML v2.0

SAML profiles require agreements between system entities regarding identifiers, binding support and endpoints, certificates and keys, and so forth. A metadata specification is useful for describing this information in a standardized way. This specification defines an extensible metadata format for SAML system entities, organized by roles that reflect SAML profiles. Such roles include that of SSO Identity Provider, SSO Service Provider, Affiliation, Attribute Authority, Attribute Requester, and Policy Decision Point.

This specification further defines profiles for the dynamic exchange of metadata among system entities, which may be useful in some deployments.

8. Conformance Requirements for SAML v2.0

This normative specification describes features that are mandatory and optional for implementations claiming conformance to SAML V2.0 and also specifies the entire set of documents comprising SAML V2.0.

9. Web Services Security: SAML Token Profile 1.1

This specification describes how to use SAML V1.1 and V2.0 assertions with the Web Services Security SOAP Message Security V1.1 specification.

10. SAML 2.0 profile of XACML

The OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language [XACML] is a powerful, standard
language that specifies schemas for authorization policies and for authorization decision requests and responses.

This profile defines how to use SAML 2.0 to protect, transport, and request XACML schema instances and other information needed by an XACML implementation.

11. Security and Privacy Considerations for SAML

This non-normative document describes and analyzes the security and privacy properties of SAML defined in the core SAML specification and the SAML bindings and profiles specifications.

12. SAML V2.0 Kerberos Attribute Profile

This specification defines an attribute profile for the Kerberos protocol. The SAML V2.0 Kerberos Attribute Profile describes a SAML attribute profile for requesting and expressing Kerberos protocol messages. In this version of the specification, this is constrained to the Kerberos KRB-CRED message type. The mechanisms that are used to generate the Kerberos message are outside the scope of this document and are described by IETF RFC 4120: 'The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)'.

13. SAML V2.0 Change Notify Protocol

The SAML V2.0 Change Notify Protocol describes request and response messages for informing SAML endpoints about available changes to subjects and attributes associated with subjects.

SAML Assertions and XML Signature

SAML assertions and SAML protocol request and response messages may be signed, with the following benefits:

1. An assertion signed by the SAML authority supports:
– Assertion integrity.
– Authentication of the SAML authority to a SAML relying party.
– If the signature is based on the SAML authority’s public-private key pair, then it also provides for non-repudiation of origin.

2. A SAML protocol request or response message signed by the message originator supports:
– Message integrity.
– Authentication of message origin to a destination.
– If the signature is based on the originator's public-private key pair, then it also provides for non-repudiation of origin.

The [1] talks about only signing the Assertion - and [2] talks about signing the request as well as the response message which also carries the Assertion.

A digital signature is not always required in SAML. For example, it may not be required in the following situations:

- In some circumstances signatures may be “inherited," such as when an unsigned assertion gains protection from a signature on the containing protocol response message. "Inherited" signatures should be used with care when the contained object (such as the assertion) is intended to have non-transitory lifetime. The reason is that the entire context must be retained to allow validation, exposing the XML content and adding potentially unnecessary overhead.

- The SAML relying party or SAML requester may have obtained an assertion or protocol message from the SAML authority or SAML responder directly (with no intermediaries) through a secured channel, with the SAML authority or SAML responder having authenticated to the relying party or SAML responder by some means other than a digital signature.

It is recommended that, in all other contexts, digital signatures be used for assertions and request and response messages. Specifically:

- A SAML assertion obtained by a SAML relying party from an entity other than the SAML authority SHOULD be signed by the SAML authority.
- A SAML protocol message arriving at a destination from an entity other than the originating site SHOULD be signed by the origin site.

XML Signatures are intended to be the primary SAML signature mechanism.

Unless a profile specifies an alternative signature mechanism, enveloped XML Digital Signatures MUST be used if signing. This is bit different from the signature pattern recommended in WS-Security specification.

WS-Security specification says..

"Because of the mutability of some SOAP headers, producers SHOULD NOT use the Enveloped Signature Transform defined in XML Signature. Instead, messages SHOULD explicitly include the elements to be signed. Similarly, producers SHOULD NOT use the Enveloping Signature defined in XML Signature".

Although this contrasts with what is recommended in SAML specification - WS-Security doesn't have nothing to with SAML. SAML becomes a token type for WS-Security and SAML specification has the full control to define it's own recommendation for signing.

Why SAML specification recommends enveloped signature?

With enveloped signature, the signature element will be inside the element been signed it self - which is the Assertion element.

Enveloped signature is useful when we have a signed XML document that we wish to insert into other XML documents. Which is the case with SAML Assertion. There you get the SAML Assertion from the issuer and include it in to a request to the service provider.

SAML implementations also SHOULD use Exclusive Canonicalization [Excl-C14N], with or without comments, both in the element of , and as a algorithm. Use of Exclusive Canonicalization ensures that signatures created over SAML messages embedded in an XML context can be verified independent of that context.

Exclusive Canonicalization tries to figure out what namespaces you are actually using and just copies those. Specifically, it copies the ones that are "visibly used", which means the ones that are a part of the XML syntax. However, it does not look into attribute values or element content, so the namespace declarations required to process these are not copied. For example if you had an attribute like xx:foo="yy:bar" it would copy the declaration for xx, but not yy. It also does not copy the xml: attributes that are declared outside the scope of the signature.

Exclusive Canonicalization allows you to create a list of the namespaces that must be declared, so that it will pick up the declarations for the ones that are not visibly used.

Exclusive Canonicalization is useful when you have a signed XML document that you wish to insert into other XML documents - as in a signed SAML assertion which might be inserted as a XML Token in the security header of various SOAP messages. The Issuer who signs the assertion will be aware of the namespaces being used and able to construct the list. The use of Exclusive Canonicalization will insure the signature verifies correctly every time.

In contrast, the Inclusive Canonicalization copies all the declarations that are currently in force, even if they are defined outside of the scope of the signature. It also copies any xml: attributes that are in force, such as xml:lang or xml:base. This guarantees that all the declarations you might make use of will be unambigiously specified. The problem with this is that if the signed XML is moved into another XML document which has other declarations, the Inclusive Canonicalization will copy them and the signature will be invalid. This can even happen if you simply add an attribute in a different namespace to the surrounding context.

References :

Key Exchange Patterns with Web Services Security

When we have message level security with web services - how we achieve integrity and confidentiality is through keys. Keys are used to sign and encrypt messages been passed from the rqeuestor to the recipient or form the client to the service and vise versa.

During this blog post, we'll be discussing different key exchange patterns and their related use cases.

1. Direct Key Transfer

If one party has a token and key and wishes to share this with another party, the key can be directly transferred. WS-Secure Conversation is a good example for this. Under WS-Secure Conversation, when the security context token is created by one of the communicating parties and propagated with a message it occupies this pattern to do the key exchange. This is accomplished by the initiator sending an RSTR (either in the body or header) to the other party. The RSTR contains the token and a proof-of-possession token that contains the key encrypted for the recipient.

The initiator creates a security context token and sends it to the other parties on a message using the mechanisms described in WS-Trust specification. This model works when the sender is trusted to always create a new security context token. For this scenario the initiating party creates a security context token and issues a signed unsolicited <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> to the other party. The message contains a <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> containing (or pointing to) the new security context token and a <wst:RequestedProofToken> pointing to the "secret" for the security context token.

2. Brokered Key Distribution

A third party MAY also act as a broker to transfer keys. For example, a requestor may obtain a token and proof-of-possession token from a third-party STS. The token contains a key encrypted for the target service (either using the service's public key or a key known to the STS and target service). The proof-of-possession token contains the same key encrypted for the requestor (similarly this can use public or symmetric keys).

WS-Secure Conversation also has an example for this pattern when the security context token is created by a security token service – The context initiator asks a security token service to create a new security context token. The newly created security context token is distributed to the parties through the mechanisms defined here and in WS-Trust. For this scenario the initiating party sends <wst:RequestSecurityToken> request to the token service and a <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection> containing a <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> is returned. The response contains a <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> containing (or pointing to) the new security context token and a <wst:RequestedProofToken> pointing to the "secret" for the returned context. The requestor then uses the security context token when securing messages to applicable services.

3. Delegated Key Transfer

Key transfer can also take the form of delegation. That is, one party transfers the right to use a key without actually transferring the key. In such cases, a delegation token, e.g. XrML, is created that identifies a set of rights and a delegation target and is secured by the delegating party. That is, one key indicates that another key can use a subset (or all) of its rights. The delegate can provide this token and prove itself (using its own key – the delegation target) to a service. The service, assuming the trust relationships have been established and that the delegator has the right to delegate, can then authorize requests sent subject to delegation rules and trust policies.

For example a custom token is issued from party A to party B. The token indicates that B (specifically B's key) has the right to submit purchase orders. The token is signed using a secret key known to the target service T and party A (the key used to ultimately authorize the requests that B makes to T), and a new session key that is encrypted for T. A proof-of-possession token is included that contains the session key encrypted for B. As a result, B is effectively using A's key, but doesn't actually know the key.

4. Authenticated Request/Reply Key Transfer

In some cases the RST/RSTR mechanism is not used to transfer keys because it is part of a simple request/reply. However, there may be a desire to ensure mutual authentication as part of the key transfer. The mechanisms of WS-Security can be used to implement this scenario.

Specifically, the sender wishes the following:
- Transfer a key to a recipient that they can use to secure a reply
- Ensure that only the recipient can see the key
- Provide proof that the sender issued the key

This scenario could be supported by encrypting and then signing. This would result in roughly the following steps:

1. Encrypt the message using a generated key
2. Encrypt the key for the recipient
3. Sign the encrypted form, any other relevant keys, and the encrypted key

However, if there is a desire to sign prior to encryption then the following general process is used:

1. Sign the appropriate message parts using a random key (or ideally a key derived from a random key)
2. Encrypt the appropriate message parts using the random key (or ideally another key derived from the random key)
3. Encrypt the random key for the recipient
4. Sign just the encrypted key

Most part of this blog post is extracted from WS-Trust 1.4 specification.

Understanding Entropy

This blog post is inspired by a question asked from one of my team mates - so.. here I am trying to explain what is entropy and it's role in web services security.

In information theory, entropy is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a random variable. In other words, entropy adds randomness to a generated key.

In WS-Trust, under Holder-of-Key scenario - the Security Token Service has to generate a key and pass that to the client - which will later be used between the client and the service to secure the communication.

Let's see how this is done.. Let's have a look at some part of the client request to the Security Token Service.
Here you can see, the Entropy element is included in the request.

This optional element allows a requestor to specify entropy that is to be used in creating the key. The value of this element should be either a <xenc:EncryptedKey> or <wst:BinarySecret> depending on whether or not the key is encrypted. Secrets should be encrypted unless the transport/channel is already providing encryption. The BinarySecret element specifies a base64 encoded sequence of octets representing the requestor's entropy.

The keys resulting from a request are determined in one of three ways...

1. Specific
2. Partial
3. Omitted

In the case of specific keys, a <wst:RequestedProofToken> element is included in the response which indicates the specific key(s) to use unless the key was provided by the requestor(in which case there is no need to return it). This happens if the requestor does not provide entropy or issuer rejects the requestor's entropy.

In the case of partial, the <wst:Entropy> element is included in the response, which indicates partial key material from the issuer (not the full key) that is combined (by each party) with the requestor's entropy to determine the resulting key(s). In this case a <wst:ComputedKey> element is returned inside the <wst:RequestedProofToken> to indicate how the key is computed. This happens if the requestor provides entropy and the issuer honors it. Here you will see, in the response it will have an Entropy element - which includes the issuer's entropy.
In the case of omitted, an existing key is used or the resulting token is not directly associated with a key. This happens if the requestor provides entropy and the responder doesn't (issuer uses the requestor's key), then a proof-of-possession token need not be returned.

Following table summarizes the use of Entropy.

Requestor Issuer Result
Provides Entropy Uses requestor entropy as key No proof-of-possession token is returned
Provides Entropy Provides entropy No keys returned, key(s) derived using entropy from both sides according to method identified in response. Issuer's Entropy is returned to the client and the way the key was derived specified under ComputedKey element.
Provides Entropy Issues own key (rejects requestor's entropy) Proof-of-possession token contains issuer's key(s)
No Entropy provided Issues own key Proof-of-possession token contains issuer's key(s)
No Entropy provided Does not issue key No proof-of-possession token

Subject Confirmation support with Apache Rampart : Holder-of-Key

The Subject Confirmation is the process of establishing the correspondence between the subject and claims of SAML statements (in SAML assertions) and SOAP message content by verifying the confirmation evidence provided by an attesting entity.

SAML 1.1 Token Profile talks about three subject confirmation methods.

1. Holder-of-key Subject Confirmation Method
2. Bearer-key Subject Confirmation Method
2. Sender-vouches Subject Confirmation Method

With Holder-of-key Subject Confirmation Method, the attesting entity demonstrates that it is authorized to act as the subject of a holder-of-key confirmed SAML statement by demonstrating knowledge of any key identified in a holder-of-key SubjectConfirmation element associated with the statement by the assertion containing the statement. Statements attested for by the holder-of-key method MUST be associated, within their containing assertion, with one or more holder-of-key SubjectConfirmation elements.

Let's see how this works..

First the client application needs to request a token from the Security Token Service or the STS. This request is known as RST [wst:RequestSecurityToken] and goes inside the SOAP Body. Following is a sample RST.
Let's have a look at some of the key elements in the RST.

1. AppliesTo

This is the end point where the client going to use this token against.

2. KeyType :

Use Symmetric key when generating the key for the SubjectConfirmation.

3. KeySize

Use this key size when generating the key for the SubjectConfirmation.

4. Entropy/BinarySecret

WS-Trust allows the requestor to provide input to the key material via a wst:Entropy element in the request. The requestor might do this to satisfy itself as to the degree of entropy (cryptographic randomness if you will) of at least some of the material used to generate the actual key which is used for SubjectConfirmation.

5. Entropy/ComputedKeyAlgorithm :

The key derivation algorithm to use if using a symmetric key for P, where P is computed using client, server, or combined entropy.

With the key is computed using P_SHA1 from the TLS specification to generate a bit stream using entropy from both sides. The exact form is:
key = P_SHA1 (EntREQ, EntRES)
It is RECOMMENDED that EntREQ be a string of length at least 128 bits.

Now let's see how this request been processed at the STS end.

Based on the Key Type in the request - STS will decide whether to use Holder-of-key or not. For following key types, holder-of-key subject confirmation method will be used.

1. trust/200512/PublicKey
2. trust/200512/SymmetricKey

If it is SymmetricKey - then STS will generate a key - encrypt the key using the public certificate corresponding to the end point attached to the AppliesTo element in the RST and add that to the SubjectConfirmation element in the response.

Key generation is once again bit tricky.

If client provides an entropy and the key computation algorithm is then, the key is generated as a function of the client entropy and the STS entropy.

If client provides an entropy but the key computation algorithm is NOT then, the key is same as the client entropy.

If neither of above happens, then the server generates an ephemeral key.

Whatever the way the key is generated, it will be encrypted with the certificate corresponding to the AppliesTo end point and will be added in to the SubjectConfirmation element in the response.

As per the above code, what you see inside CipherValue element is the encrypted key. And it is encrypted from a certificate which is having the thumbprint reference Ye9D13/K1GFRvJjgw1kSr5/rYxE=. In other words, only the service which owns the certificate having the thumbprint reference Ye9D13/K1GFRvJjgw1kSr5/rYxE= would be able to decrypt the key - which is in fact the service end point attached to the AppliesTo element. BTW... can anybody in the middle fool the service endpoint just by replacing the SubjectConfirmation element..? This is prevented by STS signing the SubjectConfirmation element along with Assertion parent element with it's private key. So - the SAML token is protected for integrity.

Okay... now the token is at the client end... In which ways the client application going to use this token.

One way is to use it as a SupportingToken and the other way is to use it as a ProtectionToken.

When we use SAML token as a ProtectionToken, client application can use it to encrypt/sign the messages going from the client to the service end point. Then the question is which key would the client use to sign and encrypt - it's the same key added to the SubjectConfirmation by the STS - but it's encrypted with the public key of the service end point - so, client won't be able to decrypt it and get access to the hidden key.

There is another way, STS passes the generated key to the client. Let's look at the following element also included in the response passed from the STS to the client - this is out side the Assertion element.
Here in the Entropy/BinarySecret STS passed the entropy created to generate the key. The key is generated as a function of the client entropy and the STS entropy - client already knows the client entropy and can find the STS entropy inside Entropy/BinarySecret in the response - so, client can derive the key from those.

Following would be the WS-Security Policy at the service end, which expects SAML token as a ProtectionToken.
<wsp:Policy wsu:Id="SgnOnlyAnonymous"
 xmlns:wsp="" xmlns:wsa=""
        <Issuer xmlns="">
         <Address xmlns="">http://localhost:8080/axis2/services/STS
         <t:TokenType xmlns:t="">
         <t:KeyType xmlns:t="">
         <t:KeySize xmlns:t="">256</t:KeySize>
         <sp:RequireInternalReference />
       <sp:Basic128 />
       <sp:Lax />
     <sp:IncludeTimestamp />
     <sp:OnlySignEntireHeadersAndBody />
    <sp:Header Name="To" Namespace="" />
    <sp:Body />
     <sp:MustSupportRefKeyIdentifier />
     <sp:MustSupportRefIssuerSerial />
     <sp:MustSupportRefThumbprint />
     <sp:MustSupportRefEncryptedKey />
     <sp:RequireSignatureConfirmation />
     <sp:MustSupportIssuedTokens />
     <sp:RequireClientEntropy />
     <sp:RequireServerEntropy />
When we use the SAML token as a SupportingToken, we basically doing nothing from it that sending it as it is to the service end in the SOAP Security Header. SubjectConfirmation goes useless here - but service end can verify whether the token been issued by a trusted STS, by verifying the signature.

Following is the WS-Security Policy at the service end - which expects SAML token as a SupportingToken.
<wsp:Policy xmlns:wsp=""
      <Issuer xmlns="">
       <Address xmlns="">
       <t:Claims Dialect=""
        <ic:ClaimType Uri="" />
       <sp:RequireInternalReference />

Cross Domain Authentication Patterns - Kerberos with STS

Business Requirements :

1. Users from domain A - need to access a service in domain B
2. Not all the users from domain A should be able to access the service in domain B [only a given group of users]
3. Users are in a Windows domain and should be not asked again to enter any credentials to access the service in domain B

What we need to achieve is..

User logs in to his Windows machine and seamlessly accesses the service in domain B - with no additional authentication steps.

Pattern - as per the diagram above..

1 & 2 : User talks to Kerberos KDC [TGS] - authenticates and gets a Kerberos TGT. This communication with KDC happens underneath when user logs in to his Windows machine.

3 & 4 : User program using the TGT, gets a Kerberos ticket to access the STS.

5 & 6 : Using the Kerberos ticket issued to the user to access the STS - user program authenticates to STS and obtains a SAML token via WS-Trust. STS also carries out an authorization check to see whether the user is eligible to access the service in domain B.

7 & 8 : User program uses the obtained SAML token to authenticate to the service in domain B. The service will validate that the token is issued from a trusted STS by verifying the signature.

Claim based authorization with WSO2 Identity Server

This blog post explains how to set up WSO2 Identity Server to do claim based authorization with XACML.

1. Download WSO2 Identity Server latest version from here.

2. The default user store of WSO2 Identity Server is running on an embedded ApacheDS server. In case you need to point it to an external LDAP server you can do it through a change in the configuration. This blog post explains how to integrate Oracle Directory Server as the User Store of WSO2 Identity Server.

3. Start the WSO2 Identity Server from [IS_HOME]\bin

4. Let's now define our authorization policy in plain English.

"A given resource can be accessed only by any user having an email address from wso2 belonging to a particular role and all the requests to any other resource other than this should fail"

5. Save the following policy in to a local file and import the file to WSO2 Identity Server XACML engine. Main --> Entitlement --> Administration --> Import New Entitlement Policy --> File System and import the policy. Then from policy list view click on the Enable button against the uploaded policy to enable the policy.

6. Looking at the policy, you might have noticed that, I have used the claim And, this should map to the attribute id, corresponding to the email, in the underlying user store. If it is LDAP then, should map to the 'mail' attribute id. This is done through the Claim Management UI,

7. Configure --> Claim Management -->

8. Now you can see all the claims used under dialect

9. Click on Edit link against any of the claims you want to update and then set the "Mapped Attribute" value to the, attribute id name from the underlying user store.

10. You can try the policy we defined, from the Entitlement TryIt tool. Main --> Entitlement --> TryIt.

ApacheCon Vancouver : Training on Web Services Security

Today is the first day at ApacheCon 2011 @ Vancouver - Canada.

My training on Web Services Security started around 2.30 in the afternoon.

First part was a presentation on different security patterns and standards - then started digging in to the Rampart code.

All the samples I used are available here. You can use a simple SVN client to get that code. It comes as Eclipse projects and when loaded in to an Eclipse workspace, just set the SAMPLES_HOME environment variable in ECLIPSE to the root of the downloaded code - it should build fine then... Following are some of the resources that you can look in to..

2. Understanding WS – Security Policy Language
3. Applying policies at binding hierarchy
4. Password Callback Handlers Explained
5. SAML Bearer Confirmation Method, Sender Vouches & Holder-of-Key
6. Identity Delegation in WS Trust 1.4
7. WS Security Policy – Asymmetric Binding Explained